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Economics

Do democratic governments improve environmental quality?
Chairperson: Katrina L. Mullan
My research question is whether democratic countries improve the environment. This
research question is important because many nowadays people are more than ever
concerned about environmental quality, and researchers have produced mixed results of
democratic governments’ effects on the environment. As an attempt to contribute to this
area of research, I implement three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships
between democratic countries and environmental quality. These three different types of
heterogeneity include different environmental outcomes, separate components of
democracy, and countries with different income levels. By using these three different types
of heterogeneity, I may better understand the mechanisms through which democratic
countries affect the environment.
Although previous studies using countries around the world report that democratic
governments usually improve environmental quality, I find that democratic countries have
an insignificant effect on the environment when I include 145 countries at the same time.
However, I find that democratic governments sometimes have effects (usually positive) on
environmental quality when I implement the three different types of heterogeneity into my
analyses.
When different environmental outcomes are considered, democratic countries reduce or
have an insignificant effect on carbon reductions, increase or have an insignificant effect
on protected areas. When individual components of democracy are considered, executive
constraints are found to be the most informative component of democracy. Finally, when
the countries with different income groups are considered, democracy in low-income
countries reduces carbon emissions, and in high-income countries reduces carbon
emissions and increases the size of protected areas.
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1. Introduction
Do democratic governments improve environmental quality? Al Gore, the 2007
Nobel Peace Prize winner, said that “an essential prerequisite for saving the environment is
the spread of democratic government to more nations of the world.”1 The spread of
democracy may be important because democratic governments may affect good environment.
Although democratic countries may affect environmental quality, research addressing
this topic has produced mixed results: some researchers find that political institutions
improve2, worsen3, or have no effect on the environment.4 These mixed results exhibited in
the literature could be attributable to a number of factors: different estimation methods or
control variables; different environmental outcomes; or alternatively, it may be that different
components of democracy have different impacts or that the relationship differs in countries
with different characteristics (e.g., income levels). I contribute to this existing body of
literature by using different types of environmental quality, different component variables
constituting democracy, and countries with different income groups to understand the
potential heterogeneity in the relationship between institutions and the environment.
What are political institutions? The Nobel prize-winning institutional economist
Douglass North (1990, 3) states that “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or,
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” Although
institutions are usually categorized into two types, formal and informal, I consider political
institutions as belonging to formal institutions.

(Gore 1992, 179).
(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008;
Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002;
Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Yoon 2014).
3
(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998).
4
Most of the papers supporting that democratic countries improve or worsen environmental quality report at
least one or more insignificant results associated with democratic governments, but emphasize the directions if
they seem to be relatively consistent.
1
2
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While various factors introduced in the previous paragraph might account for the
mixed results, institutions, the key explanatory variable of this paper, have been mostly
represented by variables from the Polity IV Project dataset by the Center for Systematic
Peace. The Polity IV Project scores the authority characteristics of states in the world. The
Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual states that the Polity IV dataset is “the most widely
used resource for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority.”
Using measures from this widely-used dataset, I hope to understand the relationships between
political institutions and environmental quality.
To understand the relationships between institutions and the environment, I treat
democracy and autocracy as separate political institutions. Treating democracy and autocracy
separately rather than as opposite ends of the same spectrum will give me new information.
The structure of democracy can be represented by a separation of power among a large
number of people whereas that of autocracy can be represented by a separation of power
among a small number of people.
Although some researchers have already incorporated autocracy in their analyses (Li
and Reuveny 2006; Neumayer 2002), most studies have excluded explicit effects of
autocracy on environmental quality. Therefore, I examine two very different political
structures to understand the relationships between political institutions and the environment.
As part of separating political institutions into democracy and autocracy, I offer a
fresh perspective by incorporating three different types of composite indicators: revised
combined Polity score, institutionalized democracy, and institutionalized autocracy. The first
two represent democracy and the last one represents autocracy. Using these three composite
indicators helps discover the mechanisms through which institutions affect environmental
quality by identifying which aspects of political institutions are important. These composite
indicators are named and managed through the Polity IV Project (Polity IV 2012).
3

I differentiate this paper from the earlier studies by incorporating separate
components of democracy in assessing the relationships between institutions and
environmental quality. I implement four different component variables: competitiveness of
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive constraints, and
competitiveness of political participation.
A country receives the highest score for competitiveness of executive recruitment if
the country’s chief executive such as a council, a cabinet, a king, a premier and a president is
selected by a competitive election involving two or more parties. A country receives the
highest score for openness of executive recruitment if the country’s chief executive is selected
by (1) a competitive election involving two or more parties, (2) an elite designation, or (3) a
pre-arrangement between a competitive election and an elite designation. A country receives
the highest score for executive constraints if the country’s accountability group such as
legislatures, a ruling party, or a council of nobles has more or equal power than a country’s
chief executive. A country receives the highest score for competitiveness of political
participation if the country’s ruling party competitively or voluntarily shifts the central power
to a competing party. These variables form institutionalized democracy which is one of the
aforementioned three composite indicators. Using these four component variables in addition
to institutionalized democracy helps understand the sources of potential heterogeneity
between political institutions and environmental quality by identifying which aspects of
democracy are important.
I also use three different measures of environmental outcomes. The environment is
very important because it can be directly related to people’s health, and the good environment
may reflect how educated or wealth a country is. The more numbers of media attention to
environmental quality issues have made people more concerned than ever. Furthermore, more
people are conscious about environmental issues through easier access to knowledge
4

accumulated by researchers. Although environmental quality can be measured in many ways,
I incorporate environmental outcomes corresponding to global air pollutants, land quality and
natural resources, and sustainable development policies. These environmental quality features
are driven by different processes, so institutions may affect them differently. Using these
comprehensive environmental outcomes, I hope to understand the relationships between
political institutions and the environment.
Finally, I extend previous work in this field by analyzing the relationships between
institutions and environmental quality for countries with different income levels. Assessing
the effects of political institutions on the environment for countries with different income
groups is important because even countries with better institutions may engage in activities
degrading environmental quality if doing so is likely to make them richer. A New York Times
columnist, Gardiner Harris (2014), writes about the Indian government’s unwillingness to
improve the environment, even when its citizens’ health suffers:
‘Suffering widespread respiratory and skin disorders, residents accuse the
government of allowing fires to burn and allowing pollution to poison
them as a way of pushing people off land needed for India’s coal rush.
“The government wants more coal, but they are throwing their own
people away to get it,” said Ashok Agarwal of the Save Jharia Coal Field
Committee, a citizens’ group.’
What is so ironic about this current event is that democratic countries may not lead to
improved environmental quality for a poor country where economic growth is a higher
priority. The Indian government rates as highly democratic, with an average institutionalized
democracy score of ≈+8.79 from 1992 to 2010 on a scale of 0 (just democratic) to +10
(strongly democratic). This example suggests that the impacts of political institutions on the
environment may differ for countries with different levels of income. Therefore, using
countries with different income groups helps discover the mechanisms through which
institutions affect environmental quality.

5

I contribute to the existing body of literature by using various measures of
environmental quality, component variables constituting democracy, and countries with
different income groups in understanding the relationships between political institutions and
the environment. Few studies researched the relationships between institutions and
environmental quality in this detail. These detailed analyses will help understand the
relationships between political institutions and the environment. This paper is organized as
follows: Section 2 reviews previous studies and provides several research hypotheses, Section
3 describes the data, Section 4 addresses estimation methodologies, Section 5 describes the
results, Section 6 discusses the results, and finally Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review and research hypotheses
Recent studies in environmental economics often focus on factors that may have
determinant effects on environmental quality. One of these factors is considered to be a
country’s level of democracy and this factor is investigated in this paper.
Early studies used cross-sectional data and found that democratic governments often
improve the environment. More recent papers use panel data due to the advancement of
technology, the increase in collection of data for economic and political analyses, and the
increase in awareness of environmental quality.
Panel data have advantages over cross-sectional data in having the option to control
for time-invariant country characteristics that may be correlated with both political
institutions and the environment. Furthermore, panel data also have an advantage in
providing a greater number of observations. Studies using panel data find that democratic
countries usually improve environmental quality, even though the results of these papers are
not fully consistent with one another.5

(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008;
Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; Yoon 2014).
5
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Existing literature suggests four key mechanisms through which democratic
governments may produce better or worse environment than autocratic governments: (1)
democratic governments aim to satisfy the majority while autocratic governments aim to
satisfy the elites, and these populations may have different preferences6; (2) democratic
governments are less likely to effectively enact policies than autocratic governments7; and (3)
democratic governments are more likely to participate in global environmental treaties than
autocratic governments.8 I will introduce these mechanisms in the order as they appear above.
Furthermore, I will provide some possible hypotheses at the end of each mechanism. The
discussion section of this paper will assess whether these hypotheses hold. Table 1 shows the
three mechanisms and the four corresponding hypotheses.
The first mechanism proposed in the existing literature is that democratic
governments aim to satisfy the majority while autocratic governments aim to satisfy the
elites, and these populations may have different preferences. In other words, democratic
governments act in the interests of the majority and autocratic governments in the interests of
the elites. In democracy, a government must act in the interests of majority because there is a
large winning coalition (De Mesquita et al. 1999). Although democratic countries act in the
interests of the majority, autocratic countries, an institution that is opposite to democracy for
this paper, act in the interests of the elites. The elites in autocracy may not like environmental
regulation if it lowers production and consumption because this reduces the elite’s benefits
(Congleton 1992). In contrast, under democracy, a greater number of people in both the

(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; De Mesquita et al. 1999; Grossman and Krueger 1995; Hosseini
and Kaneko 2013; Kotov and Nikitina 1995; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998;
Neumayer 2002; Payne 1995; Schultz and Crockett 1990).
7
(Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Hardin 1968; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Pellegrini and Gerlagh
2006; Yoon 2014).
8
(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew
2011; Payne 1995).
6
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winning coalition and the electorate may be concerned if only a few people receive benefits
from looser environmental regulations (Congleton 1992).
Since the preferences of the majority are prioritized in a democracy to a greater
degree than in an autocracy, an environmental regulation benefitting many people while
hurting only a few is more likely to be enacted. For example, Li and Reuveny (2006), and
Midlarsky (1998) find that democratic countries improve land quality and natural resources.
Since democratic governments value the preferences of majority over minority, democratic
countries have the potential to improve land quality and natural resources benefitting the
majority. For the same reasons, Barrett and Graddy (2000), Li and Reuveny (2006), and Mak
and Lew (2011) find that democratic governments improve water quality.
Conversely, autocratic countries may worsen environmental quality if its leaders
receive fewer benefits from having environmental regulations. Li and Reuveny (2006) find
that autocratic countries worsen water quality by increasing the ratio of organic pollution
levels in water to the amount of internal renewable water resources. These researchers also
find that autocratic governments worsen land quality and natural resources by decreasing the
percentage share of the forested area within the total land area; increasing average annual
deforestation rates per decade; and increasing the share of severely and very severely
degraded land out of the total land area. Furthermore, Neumayer (2002) finds that less
democratic countries worsen land quality and natural resources by decreasing the percentage
of land area under protection. Autocratic governments may worsen environmental quality
since the chance of enacting an environmental regulation, if it reduces benefits received by
autocratic leaders, is very low.
A caveat to this argument is that since democratic countries act in the interests of the
majority, democratic governments may refrain from improving the environment if the
majority of voters lose economically from certain environmental policies (Hosseini and
8

Kaneko 2013). Midlarsky (1998) finds that democratic countries worsen land quality and
natural resources by increasing the annual deforestation percentage and average soil
degradation by water. He argues that for countries where logging or other related activities
are the main sources of income, environmental regulations protecting forests are likely to be
rejected by the countries’ citizens. These countries are usually poor. This means the
relationships between political institutions and environmental quality may differ among highand low-income countries. Furthermore, demand for better environment is higher in rich
countries (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Consequently, in low-income countries, democratic
governments may worsen land quality and natural resources.
Democratic countries may not be able to improve global environmental quality in a
timely manner because democracy is national or local in character, whereas the environment
is global in character, as stated by Hosseini and Kaneko (2013) in their literature review.
Since democratic governments work in the interest of its own country, they want to improve
environmental outcomes that are externalities from a national point of view and only consider
national costs to benefits. Congleton (1992) finds that democratic countries worsen global air
quality by increasing net methane and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Finally, Midlarsky (1998)
finds that democratic governments worsen global air quality by increasing CO2 emissions per
capita. Since democratic countries have local characteristics and usually focus on
environmental quality within the borders of their countries, democratic governments may
worsen global air quality between countries.
Similarly, although autocratic countries may worsen environmental quality, research
specifically addressing autocracy suggests that autocratic governments may improve the
environment in some cases. Although Mak and Lew (2011) do not specifically measure the
impacts of autocracy in their analyses, they find that democratic countries worsen land
quality and natural resources by increasing deforestation damage. The researchers explain
9

their findings by acknowledging that autocratic governments may manage land quality and
natural resources better than democratic countries if protecting forests provides benefits to the
autocratic governments. Barrett and Graddy (2000) find that using certain measures of
democracy and certain environmental outcomes, low civil freedom dummy, one of their
variables representing low level of democracy, improves water quality. Since autocratic
countries may improve the environment if doing so gives the country’s elites benefits,
autocratic governments may improve environmental quality.
The first mechanism is that democratic governments aim to satisfy the majority while
autocratic governments aim to satisfy the elites, and these populations may have different
preferences. The existing studies addressing this first mechanism suggest that democratic and
autocratic governments may improve or worsen the environment depending on the specific
preferences of the majority and the elites in a given country. The majority of citizens in a
democracy are likely to care about environmental quality directly related to people’s health.
However, the majority may vote against regulations because of the trade-off with economic
activity if environmental issues do not directly affect the majority’s health and well-being.
Using the same argument, the majority is expected to be more supportive of regulations that
have local benefits rather than global benefits. Therefore, a possible hypothesis associated with
this first mechanism that democratic governments aim to satisfy the majority while autocratic
governments aim to satisfy the elites, and these populations may have different preferences is
as follows.
H1a: More democratic governments improve environmental outcomes directly
affecting local health, while have no effect on or worsen environmental quality
indirectly affecting local health.
There is one more reason why I hypothesize that democratic governments lead to
better environment directly related to people’s health. More access to information and rights
10

related to environmental quality helps the majority in democracy be more aware of
environmental issues. Democratic citizens have more access to the free press and other forms
of information regarding the environment (Payne 1995; Schultz and Crockett 1990).
Democratic countries allow freedom of speech and organization among its citizens who then
assemble and appeal to their governments about environmental issues (Kotov and Nikitina
1995; Payne 1995). In addition, democratic governments may be held accountable or their
ignorance of environmental quality if a noticeable environmental degradation takes place
(Payne 1995). Since exchange of ideas regularly takes place in democratic countries, good
ideas are shared. However, this mechanism will only apply if the majority are in favor of
environmental regulations.
Citizens of low- (high-) income countries care about both development and the
environment, but trading economic development for environmental improvement is relatively
more (less) costly. Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature (e.g., Grossman and
Krueger 1995) finds that high-income countries have more demand for environmental
regulations because high-income countries have achieved some level of economic
development and want to reduce environmental degradation. Therefore, another hypothesis
reflecting these differences in the costs of setting up environmental regulations and demands
for better environment is as follows.
H1b: Democratic governments lead to better environmental quality in highincome countries, while lead to lower environmental quality in low-income countries.
The second mechanism suggested in the existing studies is that democratic
governments are less likely to effectively enact policies than autocratic governments. Before
sharing papers claiming that democratic countries are less effective in enacting policies, I will
first share studies suggesting that democratic governments may be more effective in enacting
policies. Since democracy is a strong formal institution that establishes a consistent
11

foundation for enacting policies improving the environment (Gallagher and Thacker 2008),
democratic governments may improve sustainable development policies. Li and Reuveny
(2006) find that democratic countries improve sustainable development policies by
decreasing a composite index measuring environmental pollution stress. Pellegrini and
Gerlagh (2006) find that democratic governments improve sustainable development policies
by increasing an environmental protection stringency index and decreasing an environmental
regulatory regime index. Finally, Yoon (2014) finds that democratic countries improve
sustainable development policies by increasing an environmental performance index score
and an ecosystem vitality category score.
Although democratic governments may improve environmental quality, some studies
suggest that democratic countries may worsen environmental outcomes in both short run and
long run. If the environment is considered a common good, unconstrained individuals or
interest groups are more likely to overuse natural resources and ignore the damage of their
actions on environmental quality (Hardin 1968). While this study seems to be a little bit older
than other papers cited in this paper, it is so seminal that many scholars still incorporate it:
irresponsible over-usage of natural resources by people who do not care about others is more
likely to worsen the environment. Mak and Lew (2011) find that democratic governments
worsen land quality and natural resources by increasing deforestation damage.
In order to examine the ability of a government to enact policy, I focus on the extent
to which a government is constrained from taking actions. Measures of democracy consist of
separate components, not all of which affect policy implementation. Therefore, I consider
executive constraints, which is one of the four component variables constituting
institutionalized democracy. The other three component variables are competitiveness of
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and competitiveness of political
participation. Detailed descriptions about the variables are provided in the data descriptions
12

section of this paper. A government with strong executive constraints may have less freedom
to implement environmental regulations relative to a government with weak executive
constraints, or implementation may occur more slowly. However, other component variables
are not likely to have the same types of effects. Therefore, a possible hypothesis associated
with this second mechanism that democratic governments are less likely to effectively enact
policies than autocratic governments is as follows.
H2: Greater executive constraints lead to worse environmental quality. More
democratic countries, measured as other component variables (e.g., competitiveness of
political recruitment), have no effect on environmental quality.
Finally, the third mechanism suggested in the existing literature is that democratic
governments are more likely to participate in global environmental treaties than autocratic
governments. Democratic countries may improve environmental quality because democratic
governments are more likely to participate in international treaties improving the
environment (Payne 1995). Since democratic countries are more likely to participate in global
environmental treaties, they are more likely to model other successful countries also
participating in the treaties. Therefore, democratic countries may improve global air quality.
Barrett and Graddy (2000), Hosseini and Kaneko (2013), Li and Reuveny (2006), and Mak
and Lew (2011) find that democratic governments improve global air quality. Finally,
Congleton (1992) finds that democratic countries improve global air quality by decreasing net
methane per GNP.
Under this mechanism, the degree of democracy does not affect local environmental
quality. However, more democratic governments improve global environmental outcomes. A
possible hypothesis associated with this third mechanism that democratic governments are
more likely to participate in global environmental treaties than autocratic governments is as
follows.
13

H3: Democratic governments lead to better global environmental quality, while
have no effect on local environmental quality.
Research reveals mixed impacts of democratic and autocratic governments on
environmental quality. The past studies focused on relationships between income and the
environment. After learning that democratic countries may have determinant impacts on
environmental quality, researchers have carefully designed models that may explain the
relationships between democratic governments and the environment. More recent papers use
more and better data, and more sophisticated estimation methods than earlier studies due to
the advancement in a field of economics and technology. More recent papers9 seem to
produce results suggesting that democratic countries usually improve environmental quality.
However, this is not true in all cases. In addition, theoretical mechanisms suggested in
literature do not give a single clear prediction about directions of relationships.
Since the results have been mixed, this suggests that the relationships are more
complex than so far assumed. I will examine some potential sources of heterogeneity in the
relationship in order to better understand the underlying mechanisms. Therefore, my
contribution is that since the hypotheses suggest different relationships in different context, I
will investigate how the relationships between democratic countries and the environment
varies by different types of environmental outcomes, types of components constituting
democracy, and types of countries with different income levels.
3. Data descriptions
The entire dataset for this paper consists of an unbalanced panel of 145 countries
between 1992 and 2010. The dataset is unbalanced because there are different numbers of

(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Hosseini and
Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Neumayer 2002; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Yoon
2014).
9
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observations for different countries in different time periods. For example, Solomon Islands
has a number of observation of 1, which is the minimum number of observation for the entire
time span for a country. Conversely, some countries10 have a number of observations of 19,
which is the maximum number of observations for the entire time periods for a country.
Therefore, the range of number of observations is the difference between the maximum and
the minimum, and is 18 for the entire time span. The total number of observations is 1,899.
The way I calculated my sample size is different from that of Li and Reuveny (2006),
who did not make the number of observations the same for different estimations. In other
words, their reported results for CO2 per capita and organic water pollutants per km3 are from
different countries. The sample size for CO2 per capita is 3,833 and that for organic water
pollutants per km3 is 1,344. Since the samples were not from the same countries, their
estimation results would have been influenced by countries that belonged or did not belong to
the estimations. In order to isolate differences due to types of environmental outcomes from
differences due to sample composition, my sample is restricted to 1,899 observations by
excluding all the explanatory and response variables that do not have observations. The same
set of countries is also incorporated.
Since different categories of outcomes might be affected differently by political
institutions, I use three different environmental outcomes representing environmental
pollution and environmental quality as response variables. These three environmental
outcomes reflect global air pollution (CO2 emissions); measures of land and natural resources
quality (terrestrial protected areas); and sustainable development policies quality (improved
water sources).

Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland Guinea, Japan, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco,
Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, and Tunisia.
10
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Table 2 shows the bottom twelve countries and Table 3 shows the top twelve
countries for each variable to give an indication of where the variation is occurring. The value
for each variable used to rank the countries is an average value of the variable between 1992
and 2010. For example, column 1 of Table 2 represents CO2 emissions (kt)i. The variable,
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t, represents global air pollution. CO2 emissions result from the burning of
fossil fuels and the manufacturing of cement, among other things. The subscript i represents a
country. Since countries are sorted in an ascending order, countries appearing on top in Table
2 are the ones with the lowest CO2 emissions.
The subscript t attached to the variable represents a time period t. The data also
include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas
flaring. Table 4 contains descriptive statistics of all the variables. The mean and standard
deviation for CO2 emissions are 167,662 kilotons and 612,992 kilotons, respectively. CO2
emissions’ standard deviation to mean ratio exceeds a constant one which suggests that their
standard deviation is larger than their mean. This shows that CO2 emissions have a high
variability. Countries having large land area in general have high CO2 emissions, while those
having small land area have low CO2 emissions. The values for CO2 emissions are not size
adjusted. The data for CO2 emissions and all other environmental outcomes are from World
Bank Group (2012).
The variable, terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t, represents land
quality and natural resources quality. Terrestrial protected areas are totally or partially
protected areas of at least 1,000 hectares that are designated by national authorities as
scientific reserves with limited public access and other uses. The mean and standard deviation
for terrestrial protected areas are 11.93% and 9.322%. Countries having large land area in
general have high terrestrial protected areas, while those having small land area have low
terrestrial protected areas.
16

Finally, the variable, improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t,
represents sustainable development policies. It reflects the percentage of the population using
an improved drinking water sources including piped water on premises (piped household
water connections located inside the users’ dwelling, plot or yard) and other sources. The
mean and standard deviation for improved water sources are 83.81% and 18.10%. Countries
having high population density, which is calculated by total population divided by land area,
in general have high improved water sources, while those having small population density
have low improved water sources.
The aforementioned relationships among land area, population density, CO2
emissions, terrestrial protected areas, and improved water sources do not necessarily imply
causality, but attempt to give some indications of other characteristics beside income that
may be correlated with environmental quality.
The key explanatory variables for this paper are institutions. I am interested in
institutions of democracy and autocracy which are two opposite political institutions. By
separating democracy and autocracy, I may discover the mechanisms through which
institutions affect the environment by identifying which aspects of political institutions are
important. The variable, revised combined Polity scorei,t-1, represents the two different
institutions. The variable ranges from -10 to +10, a country with a closer score to -10 means
it is more autocratic and a country with a closer score to +10 means it is more democratic.
This variable is a modified version of the Polity variable for time-series analyses. It applies a
treatment filling in scaled Polity scores for observations that occur during political
interregnums and transitions, which would otherwise be treated as missing values. These data
and the other political institutional measures are from Polity IV (2012). The countries with
the lowest average value of revised combined Polity score are Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Swaziland, Uzbekistan and Oman. The countries with the highest average value of revised
17

combined Polity score are Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland and
Hungary.
The variable, institutionalized autocracyi,t-1, reflects autocracy which is an institution
favoring a fewer number of people in a ruling party and is contrasted with democracy for this
paper. It is an eleven-point scale (0 to +10) measure constructed by adding the scores
received for competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment,
executive constraints, competitiveness of political participation, and regulation of
participation using pre-determined weights.
The variable, institutionalized democracyi,t-1, represents democracy. It is an elevenpoint scale (0 to +10) measure constructed by adding the scores received for competitiveness
of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive constraints, and
competitiveness of political participation using pre-determined weights. The Polity IV
Project calls these three measures of political institutions “three composite indicators.”
Although institutionalized autocracy and institutionalized democracy look like they
share the same component variables, institutionalized autocracy is composed of one extra
component variable, regulation of participation, which does not belong to the four
component variables constituting institutionalized democracy. More importantly, although
the names of the component variables are the same, the way they are calculated is totally
different. For example, executive constraints of institutionalized autocracy have the
following criteria: (1) unlimited authority, (2) intermediate category, and (3) slight to
moderate limitations. The criteria are numbered by the Polity IV Project. A country’s
executive constraints receive a point of +3, +2, and +1 respectively if the country meets (1),
(2), and (3), respectively. Conversely, the criteria for executive constraints of institutionalized
democracy are: (7) executive parity or subordination, (6) intermediate category, (5)
substantial limitations, and (4) intermediate category. If a country meets these criteria, the
18

country’s executive constraints receive a point of +4, +3, +2, and +1, respectively. Therefore,
since the way that the component variables constituting institutionalized autocracy and
institutionalized democracy is different, these two composite indicators individually measure
autocracy and democracy.
The variable, competitiveness of executive recruitment, refers to a selection of chief
executives through popular elections matching two or more viable parties or candidates. The
variable, openness of executive recruitment, refers to the extent to which all the politically
active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized
process. The variable, executive constraints, refers to the extent of institutionalized
constraints imposed by accountability groups on the decision-making powers of chief
executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Finally, the variable, competitiveness of
political participation, refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and
leadership can be pursued in the political arena. These four component variables form
institutionalized democracy which is one of the aforementioned three composite indicators.
These four component variables are also obtained from Polity IV (2012).
In summary, the Polity IV Project data consist of the five component variables
(competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive
constraints, competitiveness of political participation, and regulation of participation). These
component variables are coded along an ordinal scale reflecting assumptions about their
relative weight. The weighted scores are summed to produce institutionalized autocracy and
institutionalized democracy (regulation of participation, the fifth component variable, is
excluded in this specific calculation). Finally, by subtracting institutionalized autocracy from
institutionalized democracy, the variable revised combined Polity score is obtained.
Although most studies include a variable for democracy and only a few studies
include a variable for autocracy, in addition to “three composite indicators,” I offer a fresh
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perspective by incorporating “four component variables”: competitiveness of executive
recruitmenti,t-1, openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1, executive constraintsi,t-1, and
competitiveness of political participationi,t-1. Using these four component variables in
addition to institutionalized democracy helps find sources of heterogeneity in explaining the
relationship between institutions and environmental quality by identifying which aspects of
democracy are important.
Institutionalized democracy and the four component variables forming
institutionalized democracy have low standard deviation to mean ratio. The mean and
standard deviation for institutionalized democracy are 5.687 and 3.968. The mean and
standard deviation for competitiveness of executive recruitment are 2.096 and 1.071. The
mean and standard deviation for openness of executive recruitment are 3.428 and 1.309. The
mean and standard deviation for executive constraints are 5.003 and 2.038. The mean and
standard deviation for competitiveness of political participation are 3.49 and 1.321.
Since institutionalized democracy and the four component variables forming
institutionalized democracy do not vary as much, institutionalized autocracy appears to drive
much of the variation in revised combined Polity score. The mean and standard deviation for
institutionalized autocracy are 1.854 and 2.79. The mean and standard deviation for revised
combined Polity score are 3.82 and 6.522.
Before I introduce my set of control variables besides the key explanatory variables,
some arguments related to the validity of the Polity IV Project measures are provided as
follows. Although many researchers attempt to develop measures representing political
institutions, a set of the most widely used measures is by the Polity IV Project (Polity IV
2012). Some alternative measures of political institutions include those of Alvarez et al.
(1996); Arat (1991); Bollen (1980, 1991, 1993); Coppedge and Reinicke (1991); Freedom
House (2000); Gasiorowski (1996); Hadenius (1992); and Vanhanen (2000). These measures
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represent political institutions, particularly democracy. They tend to be based on
effectiveness, fairness, freedom, and openness of elections; executive selections; legislative
selections; party competitiveness; and freedom of organization. In their article, Munck and
Verkuilen (2002) list the strengths and weaknesses of all of these aforementioned political
institution measures.
Although it is conceded that these political institution measures provide many useful
insights, some scholars are concerned with these measures. Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney
(2005) analyze the Central American countries to find that the principal, long-term crossnational scales of democracy including Gasiorowski (1996), Polity IV (2012), and Vanhanen
(2000) are often inaccurate. Although these three measures are considered most popular and
share high correlations based on their raw values, the researchers find that these measures are
obtained by referring to less reliable secondary sources.
The researchers examine a few countries whose democracy measures may be
contestable. One of the countries is Costa Rica. The Polity IV Project scores Costa Rica as
strongly democratic for every year between 1900 and 1999. These researchers believe that
these scores are incorrect because they are based on less reliable secondary sources (e.g.,
President Oscar Arias’ speech during an event in 1989 celebrating the centennial of Costa
Rican democracy). To mitigate issues with less reliable sources, these researchers suggest
reading Spanish-language secondary sources, the US diplomatic correspondence, government
documents, local newspaper, and interviewing local experts and eyewitnesses (Bowman
2002, Lehoucq 1992, Lehoucq and Molina 2002). By engaging in these types of activities
themselves, the researchers find that 16 coups against the central government occurred in
Costa Rica by the opposition as a response to incumbents trying to impose their successors
five times on the presidency between 1900 and 1955 (Lehoucq 1996). These researchers also
find that the minister of defense, Federico Tinoco, overthrew his predecessor, Alfredo
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González, who became the president in 1914 as a result of an extraconstitutional
compromise. González did not even participate in an election campaign during the hotly
debated 1913 general elections (Murillo Jiménez 1981).
Using more examples including the cases with El Salvador and Nicaragua, the
researchers acknowledge that the Vanhanen (2000) democracy index best measures the
effects of the US occupation and the quality of elections out of all three democracy measures.
However, the researchers also state that more reliable sources than the ones used by
Vanhanen (2000) should be considered, and list many historically important events that may
influence democracy measures of these countries.
Although Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (2005) recommend political institution
measures from Vanhanen (2000), one of the most widely used measures for political
institutions are from the Polity IV Project and many scholars implement them in their
analyses (e.g., Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Li and
Reuveny 2003; 2006). However, many studies use these measures without explicitly
justifying their reasons. This may potentially be attributable to a well-established tradition of
using these measures in academic research, and lack of information provided by the Polity IV
Project regarding their theoretical arguments and weighting schemes when calculating the
variables (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).
The Polity IV Project analysts are the ones assigning a score for each country on
each scale. According to the Polity IV Project website, these analysts monitor “real-time
events to make tentative assessments of the trajectories of unfolding political dynamics and
their effect on the essential qualities of governing institutions, or patterns of authority.”
Therefore, these analysts score the countries by monitoring real-time events from numerous
sources, while these sources usually are not provided. One of a very few relevant statements
found in the Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual states that “multiple historical sources
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were used for each country, along with reference to a variety of standard sources. The first
step was to identify historical and social science works for each country, then to compile
from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial change were identified in this
process and then examined in detail to determine whether events met the specified criteria for
changes in and of polities. The same sources provided information for the coding of authority
characteristics.” Therefore, the Polity IV Project analysts indeed refer to relevant sources, but
these sources are not necessarily reported in the Manual probably due to too many volumes
and limited writing spaces. Finally, the Polity IV Project website states that these analysts
regularly re-examine recent annual Polity records during each annual update, re-examine
historical cases because users and country experts raise questions about the data, and may
refine the data based on new information or the correction of errors in the records. Therefore,
the Polity IV Project analysts are aware of the fact that their data are not always correct, and
attempt to make many corrections to improve their data.
Some scholars report problems associated with the Polity IV Project data. Munck and
Verkuilen (2002) state that the Polity IV Project’s five component variables are weighted
differently by using different scales and assigning a different number of points for each
component variable. The researchers claim that although weighted scores provide a legitimate
way of acknowledging the greater or lesser theoretical importance of different component
variables, the Polity IV Project has no justification for the weighting scheme. Therefore, these
researchers claim that the Polity IV Project analysts use subjective pre-determined scores
without providing specific information on how the weighting scheme works for each
component for each country. The researchers also claim that this operation is not based on
theoretical justification and the Polity IV Project has conceptual logic problems. These
researchers argue that the Polity IV Project data include pairs of redundant component
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variables, which lead to a fair amount of double counting that is never acknowledged or
explained.
Although Munck and Verkuilen (2002) share concerns with the Polity IV Project
data, these researchers describe some objective strengths of the Polity IV Project data. As
opposed to other political institution measures, the Polity IV data clearly identify the
component variables; provide specific coding rules in a fair amount of detail; use multiple
codes; do good jobs in the recording and publicizing of the coding rules, the coding process,
and the disaggregated data. Furthermore, the researchers acknowledge that since the Polity IV
Project data are publicly available, independent scholars may tailor the data for their own use.
Although the Polity IV Project data do not necessarily share information on what
kind of theoretical arguments are incorporated and use subjective judgments on their
weighting schemes, some other scholars praise the measures’ advantages. Gerring et al.
(2005) acknowledge that the measures usually offer extensive country coverage (all
sovereign polities except microstates) and good historical coverage. Furthermore, the
measures help consider both the degree and the duration of democracy in any given countryyear. These researchers argue that, compared to other measures of democracy, the Polity IV
Project measures are on average better. Confirming that the measures correlate highly with
other democracy measures, the researchers state that there is no reason to suspect systematic
errors in the Polity IV Project measures. However, the researchers acknowledge that
democracy measures from the Polity IV Project may be prone to errors, and the construction
of the measures is very complex.
Many papers tried to establish measures capturing democracy11, but Bowman,
Lehoucq, and Mahoney (2005) claim that many of these attempt to generate measures based

(Alvarez et al. 1996; Arat 1991; Bollen 1980, 1991, 1993; Coppedge and Reinicke 1991; Freedom House
2000; Gasiorowski 1996; Hadenius 1992; Vanhanen 2000).
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on less reliable sources. However, due to the aforementioned strengths, data availability, and
a wide-implementation, I use political institution measures from the Polity IV Project in my
paper. Although the measures are appreciated by academic communities and sometimes do a
good job capturing the characteristics of democracy, users of the Polity IV Project should not
believe that the measures are perfect and use them with caution.
In addition to the key explanatory variables, I use a number of control variables. The
control variables included are the ones that may vary with both political institutions and the
environment. If they are not included, the estimations would produce biased impacts of
institutions on environmental quality.
Some of the control variables that are widely used by other studies include types of
economic development measures of countries.12 The variable, GDP per capita (constant 2005
US $)i,t-1, represents economic development of countries. Since past studies find that
environmental degradation against income is represented as an inverted U shape (Grossman
and Krueger 1995), GDP per capita and its squared term are used to reflect economic
development of the countries. This inverted U relationship is called an Environmental
Kuznets Curve (EKC). As an economy produces more output, its income or GDP per capita
increases. However, as income increases, environmental degradation increases due to more
waste coming from more intensive production processes. However, this degradation stops at a
location called the turning point because more people recognize the importance of
environmental quality (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Therefore, degradation decreases as
income passes the turning point, and cleaner production technology and fewer resources are
used. Data are in constant 2005 US dollars. The mean and standard deviation for GDP per

(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008;
Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002;
Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Yoon 2014).
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capita are $9,847 and $14,636. The ratio of GDP per capita exceeds a constant one. The data
for GDP per capita and all other control variables are from World Bank Group (2012).
Another important set of control variables that are widely used by other studies
include the size of nations.13 Two measures represent the size of nations. They are the
variables total populationi,t-1, and land area (km2)i,t-1. Total population is a mid-year estimate
and this figure counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship except for refugees
not permanently settled in the country of asylum. Land area is a country's total area,
excluding area under inland water bodies and other zones. I hypothesize that as total
population increases, CO2 emissions increase due to more people consuming and producing
goods. Furthermore, I hypothesize that as total population increases, terrestrial protected
areas decrease due to more people using agricultural land for food and industry. The mean
and standard deviation for total population are approximately 40 million and 133 million.
Total population has the highest standard deviation to mean ratio out of all control variables.
The mean and standard deviation for land area are approximately 808,583 km2 and 2 million
km2.
Another variable, urban population (% of total)i,t-1, is a measure of the structure of
the economy. Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national
statistical offices. The mean and standard deviation for urban population are 55.08% and
22.51%.
I use two other control variables. The first variable reflects economic activities, and
the second variable represents social activities. The variable, trade (% of GDP)i,t-1, reflects
economic activities. Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured
as a share of gross domestic product. Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) give an example of

(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew
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trade that may affect the environment. The researchers state that environmental quality of a
country increases as a country trades environmentally clean goods such as compostable
products. The researchers also state that these countries are obligated to have more stringent
environmental regulations imposed by some international treaties that the countries have
signed. Furthermore, the researchers argue that trade may improve economic development of
countries, which then may improve the environment by decreasing environmental pollution.
This is a similar justification used to explain the EKC. The mean and standard deviation for
trade are 79.61% and 41.17%.
The second control variable reflecting social activities is the variable primary
education enrollment ratei,t-1. This is obtained by dividing the total number of students
enrolled in public and private primary education institutions by population of age between 0
and 14. Li and Reuveny (2006) claim that national structural variables (e.g., education) may
affect environmental degradation. The mean and standard deviation for primary education
enrollment rate are approximately 36.2% and 8.92%. The descriptive statistics in Table 5
suggest that environmental outcomes, and economic activities vary more than political
institutions do.
Figures 1 and 2 display environmental outcomes across countries and over time,
respectively. The data for Figure 1 are the average values for each country, while those for
Figure 2 are the average values for each time period. Since both terrestrial protected areas
and improved water sources are in percentage, proportion of CO2 emissions instead of actual
CO2 emissions is used for easier comparisons. Proportion of CO2 emissions is calculated by
dividing the actual CO2 emissions by the maximum CO2 emissions value.
Figure 1 plots environmental quality against institutionalized democracy. Although
the countries’ names are not labeled for visual convenience, improved water sources show
the steepest slope, which suggests that more democratic countries are associated with high
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improved water sources. The slopes of other two environmental outcomes are not as steep.
Therefore, improved water sources vary the most across countries.
Figure 2 plots environmental quality against time represented by year. Unlike Figure
1, where improved water sources have the steepest slope, proportion of CO2 emissions has
the steepest slope. This seems to suggest that more recent time periods are associated with
high CO2 emissions. The slopes of other two environmental outcomes are not as steep.
Therefore, CO2 emissions vary the most across the time span. Tables 5 and 6 show the
correlations of the response variables and explanatory variables, respectively.
4. Methodologies
The majority of recent studies on this topic use panel data. Consequently, the
estimation methods switched from a simple estimation method of ordinary least squares
(OLS)14 to more advanced estimation methods, including two-way fixed effects estimation15,
a random effects estimation16, and generalized least squares.17
I, similarly, conduct panel data analyses. I use a two-way fixed effects model to
control for unobserved heterogeneity in country characteristics as well as general trends over
time. Equation (1.1) below helps describe a two-way fixed effects estimation.
(1.1)

𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳 𝑽𝑨𝑹𝑰𝑨𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑺𝛀 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡 .
In a two-way fixed effects model in Equation (1.1), 𝛼𝑖 is an unobserved

heterogeneity capturing all unobserved characteristics staying constant over time and

14

(Congleton 1992; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006).
(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006;
Yoon 2014).
16
(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013).
17
(Mak and Lew 2011; Yoon 2014).
15

28

affecting Environmental qualityi,t, which consists of CO2 emissionsi,t, terrestrial protected
areasi,t, and improved water sourcesi,t.
Political institutionsi,t-1 consists of revised combined Polity scorei,t-1, institutionalized
autocracyi,t-1, institutionalized democracyi,t-1, competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1,
openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1, executive constraintsi,t-1, and competitiveness of
political participationi,t-1.
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳 𝑽𝑨𝑹𝑰𝑨𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑺 is a vector of control variables and is multiplied by a
coefficient vector 𝛀. CONTROL VARIABLES consists of GDP per capitai,t-1, its squared
term, total populationi,t-1, urban populationi,t-1, land areai,t-1, tradei,t-1, primary education
enrollment ratei,t-1, and YEAR DUMMIES, which is a vector of year dummies.
Some unobserved characteristics that vary across countries (𝛼𝑖 ) include global/local
biophysical attributes (e.g., atmospheric integrity, existing damage, and climate). These
unobserved characteristics may affect environmental quality (Li and Reuveny 2006). Cultural
factors may affect care for the environment. Historical focus on certain types of policies may
also affect environmental quality. Furthermore, other measures such as geographical features,
demographic features of the population (age, race, and etc.), and historical differences (e.g.,
attitudes) toward the environment are also included in 𝛼𝑖 .18 Although these characteristics
may not always be constant, they are considered approximately constant because they change
very slowly over time.
The fixed effect, 𝛼𝑖 , may be correlated with political institutions because it may help
shape certain institutions. Therefore, my estimated results may be biased if I fail to control
for the unobserved heterogeneity, 𝛼𝑖 .
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Consequently, I implement a two-way fixed effects estimation using time-demeaned
variables to remove the unobserved heterogeneity from Equation (1.1). A pooled OLS
estimator that is based on the time-demeaned variables is called the fixed effects estimator.19
A pooled OLS is different from a regular OLS by having year dummies. The fixed effects
transformation successfully removes any explanatory variable that is constant over time for
all countries.20 Therefore, my estimation would eliminate bias due to correlations of the fixed
effect, 𝛼𝑖 , with variables measuring institutions.
Although a two-way fixed effects estimation helps produce more reliable results,
there is a cost. Since a two-way fixed effects model only captures variation within countries
over time instead of variation between countries, a two-way fixed effects model uses less
variation. Therefore, since much variation in the response variables is not explained by other
right-hand-side (RHS) variables, especially by the political institutions, I may not be able to
find many statistically significant results.
The error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , in Equation (1.1) is an idiosyncratic error. It represents unobserved
characteristics changing over time, affecting Environmental qualityi,t and Political
institutionsi,t-1. Although I may not be able to fully remove an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , I
include control variables to reduce the effects of an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 . The control
variables include GDP per capita, its squared term, total population, urban population, land
area, trade, primary education enrollment rate, and YEAR DUMMIES. However, this
approach may not fully control some other remaining unobserved characteristics varying over
time, which will bias the results.
Even after controlling the effects of an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , a simultaneity
problem may be an issue. If I use explanatory variables in a given year with response

19
20

(Wooldridge 2008, 485).
(Wooldridge 2008, 485).

30

variables in the same year, there may be a problem of simultaneity: I may not be able to tell
whether it is institutions influencing environmental quality or it is the environment
influencing political institutions. As Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) provide as a
justification for their use of instrumental variable (IV) estimation, countries with poor
environmental quality may demand more democracy. Therefore, the environment may
influence institutions. Furthermore, a simultaneity problem is not only relevant to the
response variables and the key explanatory variables but also to the control variables:
degradation in land quality may reduce agricultural economy’s exports, or an increase in
exports resulting from high production may worsen environmental quality. To reduce this
effect, I lag all the RHS variables by one year. Other studies (e.g., Oneal and Russett 1999; Li
and Reuveny 2003; 2006) also follow this approach.
Since there are issues of heteroskedasticity, I implement the Huber-White robust
standard errors (White 1982) to control for possible heteroskedasticity issues, which represent
a state where the variance of an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , is not constant. Furthermore, there is
another issue of serial correlations. However, the year dummies capturing the temporal
dynamics in the panel data in my two-way fixed effects estimation already control for
possible serial correlation issues (Li and Reuveny 2006), which represent a state where there
are correlations between idiosyncratic errors, 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , in different time periods.
Instead of using a one-tailed test, I use a two-tailed test. A one-tailed test assesses
whether a positive effect of democratic governments on environmental quality has the same
magnitude as a negative effect of democratic countries on the environment. A two-tailed test
assesses whether there is an effect of democratic governments on environmental quality
against a null hypothesis that there is no effect of democratic countries on the environment.
Many other studies follow this latter approach (e.g., Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998;
Oneal and Russett 1999; Li and Reuveny 2003; 2006).
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Finally, if I find different relationships between democratic governments and
environmental quality by using all countries at the same time, I may not be able to get valid
estimates for countries with different income levels. Therefore, I also interact institutions and
countries with four different income groups (low-, lower middle-, upper middle-, and highincome).
5. Empirical results
Table 7 displays the effects of the three composite indicators of political institutions
on three different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 3 show the results on CO2
emissions. Columns 4 through 6 show the results on terrestrial protected areas. Columns 7
through 9 show the results on improved water sources. All the samples for Tables 7 through
10 were taken from 1992 to 2010 in 145 countries.
In columns 1 through 3, democratic governments have an insignificant effect on CO2
emissions, and autocratic countries are not significantly associated with CO2 emissions. In
columns 4 through 6, autocratic governments are positively associated with terrestrial
protected areas. Democratic countries do not significantly affect terrestrial protected areas.
In columns 7 through 9, there appears to be no impact of democratic governments on
provision of improved water sources. Autocratic countries have an insignificant impact on
improved water sources.
Among the control variables, an increase in GDP per capita has a positive but
diminishing effect on CO2 emissions, even though the squared term of GDP per capita is
insignificant. CO2 emissions are also higher for countries with larger populations. The control
variables are insignificantly associated with terrestrial protected areas. Finally, an increase
in GDP per capita has a negative but increasing effect on improved water sources. Improved
water sources are also higher for countries with larger populations, and higher levels of
education.
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Given the lack of an overall relationship between the composite indicators of
institutions and environmental quality, I examine the impacts of four individual component
variables of democracy. Table 8 displays the effects of the four component variables on three
different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 4 show the results on CO2 emissions.
Columns 5 through 8 show the results on terrestrial protected areas. Columns 9 through 12
show the results on improved water sources. Since the signs and significance of coefficients
for the control variables are very similar to those reported in Table 7, Tables 8 through 10
include the control variables in regressions, but do not report their coefficients to help focus
on the impacts of the political institutions.
In columns 1 through 4, all components of democracy do not significantly affect CO2
emissions. In columns 5 through 8, I observe no significant effect of all components of
democracy besides a positive effect of competitiveness of political participation on terrestrial
protected areas. In columns 9 through 12, all components of democracy do not significantly
affect improved water sources.
Not a single component of democracy has effects on environmental outcomes
besides competitiveness of political participation. It is interesting to observe that both
institutionalized autocracy and competitiveness of political participation have a positive
effect on terrestrial protected areas given that the Polity IV Project states that countries
scoring high on institutionalized autocracy oppress competitiveness of political participation.
Although institutionalized autocracy and competitiveness of political participation
have a significantly positive effect on terrestrial protected areas, political institutions in
general do not seem to affect environmental quality. Little variation in institutions over time
may be one of several reasons why there is a lack of significance.
However, even if there is not one overall effect of political institutions on the
environment, it is possible that there may be effects that vary by context: there are different
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effects on different environmental quality, the distinct components of democracy affect the
environment in different ways, and the relationship between democratic governments and
environmental outcomes varies in countries with different income groups. The previous
insignificant effects of institutions on environmental quality may be due to a failure to
account for these differences. Therefore, I will use interaction terms to separately identify the
impacts of political institutions for different income levels rather than estimating a single
effect for all countries. This reasoning is also supported by Mak and Lew (2011) and is
further discussed in the discussion section of this paper. Therefore, I include interaction terms
between institutions and countries with different income groups (e.g., executive constraints ×
low-income country dummy). This approach is different from the one used by Mak and Lew
(2011) who just use sub-samples of countries with different income levels.
Table 9 displays the marginal effects of the three composite indicators at four
different income groups on three different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 3
show the results on CO2 emissions. Columns 4 through 6 show the results on terrestrial
protected areas. Columns 7 through 9 show the results on improved water sources. When the
effects of political institutions on environmental quality are estimated separately for countries
with different income levels, the relationships between democratic countries and
environmental outcomes differ in sign, statistical significance and magnitude.
Since Tables 9 and 10 report marginal effects, interpretations on the coefficients are
different from those for Tables 7 and 8. In columns 1 through 3 (see Table 9), revised
combined Polity score and institutionalized democracy reduce CO2 emissions in low-, and
high-income countries. There is no significant effect in lower middle- and upper middleincome countries.
In columns 4 through 6, institutionalized autocracy increases terrestrial protected
areas in lower middle-income countries, while the results on revised combined Polity score
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and institutionalized democracy suggest that democratic governments increase terrestrial
protected areas in high-income countries. There is no significant effect in low- and upper
middle-income countries. The results jointly show that democratic countries increase
terrestrial protected areas in high-income countries. In columns 7 through 9, democratic
governments do not significantly affect provision of improved water sources in any of the
income groups.
Table 10 displays the marginal effects of the four component variables at four
different income groups on three different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 4
show the results on CO2 emissions. Columns 5 through 8 show the results on terrestrial
protected areas. Columns 9 through 12 show the results on improved water sources.
Where there is a relationship observed between democratic countries and
environmental quality, it appears to be mainly driven by executive constraints. Executive
constraints reduce CO2 emissions in low- and high-income countries, while the results on
executive constraints suggest that democratic countries increase terrestrial protected areas in
high-income countries. Executive constraints reduce improved water sources in low-income
countries. There is no significant effect in lower middle- and upper middle-income countries.
The results jointly show that executive constraints reduce CO2 emissions in low- and highincome countries, and increase terrestrial protected areas in high-income countries.
The other three measures are largely not significant. Some exceptions are that
openness of executive recruitment in low-income countries reduces CO2 emissions.
Competitiveness of political participation in high-income countries increases terrestrial
protected areas. Furthermore, openness of executive recruitment in upper middle-income
countries increases improved water sources.
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6. Discussion
The key finding of this paper is that some aspects of democracy improve some aspects
of environmental quality in some countries. For example, out of the four component
variables, executive constraints have the greatest number of effects on the environment
compared to other aspects of democracy followed by openness of executive recruitment,
competitiveness of political participation, and competitiveness of executive recruitment. Out
of the three environmental outcomes, democratic governments have the greatest number of
effects on CO2 emissions followed by terrestrial protected areas and improved water sources.
There appear to be generally positive effects on environmental quality in low- and highincome countries, and positive or insignificant effects in middle-income countries.
Although the existing literature seems to suggest that democratic governments
usually improve environmental quality, my findings suggest that political institutions,
whether they are measured as democracy, autocracy, or component variables of democracy,
do not have significant overall effects on the environment if I use all 145 countries at the
same time. These findings are displayed in Tables 7 and 8, and indicate that the relationships
between democratic governments and environmental quality are more complex than the
existing literature suggests. Studies that generally show an effect usually share similar
methodologies as mine, but cover earlier time periods and do not necessarily include control
variables capturing education. The relationships do vary by context however, there are
different impacts on environmental outcomes, the separate components of democracy
influence the environment in different ways, and the relationship between democratic
countries and environmental quality varies in countries with different income levels.
In Tables 7 and 8, democratic governments have no overall significant effect on the
environment even though two of the three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships
between democratic countries and environmental quality (different environmental quality and
36

different components of democracy) are implemented. I attribute this insignificance to a
failure of incorporating another and probably more informative type of heterogeneity,
countries with different income groups. Implementing this last type of heterogeneity with the
former two produces much more informative results. These results are provided in Tables 9
and 10.
The discussion below refers to Table 9. Democracy in low-income countries reduces
carbon emissions. My results suggest that as opposed to less democratic, low-income
countries, it is more democratic, low-income countries that reduce carbon emissions even
though the existing studies (e.g., Grossman and Krueger 1995) states that people in lowincome countries usually develop more interests in economic development. One other
possible reasons is that more contemporary low-income countries do not necessarily follow
the footsteps by the other traditional low-income countries. The more contemporary lowincome countries learn from the mistakes by the other traditional low-income countries and
develop interests in saving the environment. Democratic countries having positive impacts on
carbon reductions help support a view that democracy in low-income countries improves the
environment even though low-income countries are usually thought to be primarily interested
in economic development.
I find that autocracy in lower middle-income countries improves the size of protected
areas. This finding seems to be supportive of the idea by Mak and Lew (2011), who argue
that autocratic countries will better manage land quality and natural resources if doing so
provides the elites more benefits. This result seems to be deriving the positive association
between autocratic governments and protected areas reported in Table 7.
Democracy in high-income countries has the most significant impacts, and all of
them are associated with improvement in carbon reductions and protected areas. Although the
existing papers (e.g., Grossman and Krueger 1995) state that people in high-income countries
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usually develop more interests in improving the environment, my results suggest that it is
democratic, high-income countries that reduces carbon emissions and increases the size of
protected areas. Since high-income countries are usually known to be more interested in
improvements in environmental quality, democratic countries having positive impacts on
carbon reductions and protected areas help support a view that democracy in high-income
countries improves the environment.
I find that democratic governments have an insignificant effect on access to clean
drinking water. One possible reason for the absence of a relationship between democratic
countries and access to improved water sources is that most countries have achieved high
levels of access to clean drinking water regardless of how democratic they are. Descriptive
statistics in Table 4 show that the mean of access to improved water sources between 1992
and 2010 is 83.81%. This suggests that roughly 83.81% of the population around the world
has access to clean drinking water. Since access to improved water sources are directly
related to people’s health, countries might have prioritized development of access to clean
drinking water more than other environmental quality, regardless of their institutions.
Therefore, access to improved water sources may not be a good response variable to check
whether democratic and autocratic governments may influence the environment. The three
composite indicators still have an insignificant effect on clean drinking water sources even if
I only compare the results among low-income countries.
More meaningful results are also found when the analyses incorporate components of
democracy. Executive constraints in low- and high-income countries improve carbon
reductions (see Table 10), and executive constraints in high-income countries increase the
size of protected areas. This seems to suggest that although accountability groups have more
or equal power than a chief executive, agreements on policies related to environmental
quality that are global in nature may be more easily achieved than expected in low- and high38

income countries. Since the coefficients of executive constraints share the same signs and
have a larger magnitude than those of democratic countries, this component of democracy
seems to be deriving the previous results of revised combined Polity score and
institutionalized democracy observed in Table 9.
Except in a few cases (openness of executive recruitment in low- and upper middleincome countries; and competitiveness of political participation in high-income countries), all
other components of democracy beside executive constraints have an insignificant effect on
the environment. In general, these other components of democracy do not necessarily
represent time it takes to process decisions related to environmental quality. However, these
components besides executive constraints are more about ways chief executives get selected
and shifts of power between a ruling party and a competing power. Hence, competitiveness of
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and competitiveness of political
participation have less direct impacts on environmental quality as opposed to executive
constraints. Therefore, these other components of democracy usually have an insignificant
effect on the environment.
Since an overall discussion on the empirical findings has been provided, I now compare
the results with my hypotheses developed in the literature review and research hypotheses
section. As democratic governments are expected to act in the interest of the majority to a
greater extent than autocratic governments, the impacts of democratic countries were predicted
to be positive for environmental outcomes directly affecting local health and in high-income
countries. The relationship was hypothesized to be insignificant or negative for environmental
quality indirectly affecting local health and negative for democracy in low-income countries.
Access to improved water sources are considered to have direct health impacts, while carbon
reductions and protected areas are indirect.
Democracy in high-income countries reduces carbon emissions, increases the size of
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protected areas, but has an insignificant impact on access to clean drinking water. This partially
agrees with the hypothesis that democracy in high-income countries has a positive impact on
the environment. However, this disagrees with the hypothesis that democratic governments
have an insignificant or a negative impact on environmental quality indirectly affecting local
health. Democracy in low-income countries reduces carbon emissions. This disagrees with the
hypothesis that democracy in low-income countries has a negative impact on environmental
quality. Finally, the results show that democratic countries have an insignificant effect on
access to improved water sources. This disagrees with the hypothesis that democratic
governments have a positive impact on environmental quality directly affecting local health.
Overall, democratic processes have no significance on environmental outcomes directly
affecting local health, while democracy in high-income countries improves the environment.
Since democratic governments are associated with high executive constraints and thus
a chief executive’s decisions may be rejected by accountability groups, the impacts of executive
constraints were predicted to be negative for environmental quality. The results show that
executive constraints in low- and high-income countries reduce carbon emissions and increase
the size of protected areas. These findings disagree with the hypothesis. Executive constraints
in low-income countries are associated with less access to clean drinking water. This partially
agrees with the hypothesis. Overall, executive constraints improve the environment.
Since democratic governments are expected to participate more in global
environmental treaties, the impacts of democratic governments were predicted to be positive
for global environmental quality. The relationship was hypothesized to be insignificant for a
local environmental outcome. Access to improved water sources is considered to be local
environmental quality, while carbon reductions and protected areas are global.
The results show that democratic countries have an insignificant effect on local
environmental outcome agreeing with the hypothesis that democratic governments have an
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insignificant effect on local environmental quality. Democracy in low-income countries
reduces carbon emissions, and democracy in high-income countries reduces carbon emissions
and increases protected areas. This partially agrees with the hypothesis that democratic
governments have a positive effect on global environmental quality. Overall, democracy in
low- and high-income countries improves the environment.
The hypotheses and the results in general support a view that there is no
single/straightforward impact of democratic countries on environmental quality. However, the
relationships vary by context: there are different effects on different environmental outcomes,
the individual components of democracy influence the environment in different paths, and the
relationships between democratic governments and environmental quality vary in countries
with different income groups.
Once these three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships between
democratic governments and environmental quality are considered, the idea of democratic
countries improving the environment because it acts in the interests of majority partially
seems to work. Democracy in high-income countries reduces carbon emissions and increases
the size of protected areas. The idea of more executive constraints worsening environmental
quality because agreements on policies between a chief executive and accountability groups
having more or equal power than a chief executive is more difficult does not seem to hold.
Executive constraints in low- and high-income countries reduce carbon emissions and
increase protected areas. Finally, the idea that democratic countries improving global
environmental quality because democratic countries have higher participation rates in global
environmental treaties seems to hold. Democracy in low- and high-income countries reduces
carbon emissions, and democracy in high-income countries increase the size of protected
areas.
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7. Conclusion
Some aspects of democracy improve some aspects of environmental quality in some
countries. The key findings of this paper are as follows: Out of four different components of
democracy, executive constraints have the most number of effects on environmental quality.
Democratic governments have the most number of effects on CO2 emissions. Finally, middleincome countries have an insignificant or positive effect on the environment, while low- and
high-income countries usually have a positive impact on environmental quality.
I consider democratic governments and environmental quality in this paper. In general,
democratic countries seem to have an insignificant effect on the environment when all 145
countries are used at the same time. However, when I include different types of environmental
outcomes, components of democracy, and countries with different income levels, democratic
governments sometimes have effects (usually positive) on environmental quality. I implement
these three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships between democratic countries
and environmental quality to better understand the sources of potential heterogeneity.
When considering different environmental outcomes, based on Table 9, I find that
democratic governments either reduce or have no effect on carbon emissions, increase or have
no effect on the size of protected areas, and have no effect on access to clean drinking water.
When separate components of democracy are used, I find that executive constraints are the
most important component variable. Finally, when countries with different income groups are
considered, democracy in low-income countries reduces carbon emissions, and in high-income
countries it reduces carbon emissions and increases protected areas. However, democracy in
middle-income countries has an insignificant effect on the environment.
Since the existing studies find that democratic countries usually improve
environmental quality, its policy implications are that countries should become more
democratic to improve the local and global environment. However, my findings suggest that
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becoming democratic does not always lead to improved environmental quality, and there are
many other factors to consider when improvement of the environment is a main concern.
Democracy in low- and high-income countries reduce carbon emissions, democracy
in high-income countries improve protected areas, while democracy in middle-income
countries have an insignificant effect on environmental quality. Therefore, a policy
implication is that democratic governments improve the environment if the majority prefers
improvements in environmental quality.
Executive constraints in low- and high-income countries improve carbon reductions
and the size of protected areas, while executive constraints in middle-income countries have
an insignificant effect on the environment. A policy implication is that an agreement on
environmental quality is feasible even if there is a high level of executive constraints.
Finally, democratic governments improve global environmental outcomes because
democratic countries participate more in global environmental treaties. A policy implication
is that other countries should support democracy because it helps improve the environment.
My results seem to be quite different from the existing studies, which find that
democratic governments usually improve environmental quality using all the countries at the
same time. Although my research shares similarity with many existing papers in using panel
data and a two-way fixed effects estimation, I differ from the existing studies by including
more explanatory variables that may affect political institutions and the environment.
Existing papers do not necessarily have as many important control variables as mine does.
Although existing studies mostly have GDP per capita, its squared term and some variables
related to populations, my set of controls differ from the existing papers by including total
population, land areas, and urban population all at the same time. Furthermore, I include
trade and primary education enrollment rate. By including another economic variable and an
education variable that not many studies have included, my results reduce issues related to
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omitted variables and provide more detailed insights on the relationships between democratic
governments and environmental quality.
The effects of democratic countries may operate through these additional control
variables. In other words, if democratic governments increase trade or education, and these are
the mechanisms through which democratic countries improve the environment, the effect will
be removed by including them as controls. Therefore, an inclusion of these control variables
may be one possible reason for less significance for democratic governments on environmental
quality.
In addition to including more relevant control variables, the results differ from prior
papers by incorporating three different environmental outcomes capturing comprehensive
environmental quality. Although some previous studies are interested in the relationship
between political institutions and the environment, some papers only include one or two
environmental outcomes. Therefore, by implementing a broader set of environmental
outcomes, my results better explain the relationships between democratic countries and
environmental quality. These relationships are complex and not easily explained by just one
or two environmental outcomes. For example, assume there is another researcher studying
sulphur dioxide (SO2), deforestation, and fecal coliforms. The first two environmental
outcomes represent local environmental quality and the latter one represents environmental
outcome affecting local health. By having these different types of environmental quality, the
researcher may better understand the sources of potential heterogeneity in the relationships
between democratic governments and the environment.
As more control variables and environmental outcomes are implemented, I also
differentiate my work from the existing studies by incorporating components of democracy.
Since there are many factors constituting democracy, it is important to look for which factor
plays an important role in explaining the relationships between democratic countries and
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environmental quality. Assessing the component variables of democracy specifically is a very
unique approach and doing so provides useful results. Let us again consider the case of the
hypothetical researcher. Since SO2 and deforestation may be considered as local
environmental quality and fecal coliform as environmental quality affecting local health, the
researcher would be less likely to find some significant results without considering separate
components of democracy as my results do with access to improved water sources.
Therefore, this researcher should consider using individual components of democracy to
better understand the mechanisms through which democratic countries affect the
environment.
Finally, by comparing countries with different income levels, it is possible to learn
the differences between democratic and autocratic governments in countries with different
income groups. Although most studies include variables that are related to GDP per capita,
the papers do not usually consider countries with different income levels separately. Assume
again the case of the hypothetical researcher. As the results with openness of executive
recruitment in upper middle-income countries, and executive constraints in low-income
countries show, more significant relationships are expected if we consider countries with
different income groups. Therefore, by including countries with different income levels, we
may better understand the sources of potential heterogeneity in the relationships between
democratic governments and environmental quality.
For future research, more environmental outcomes should be included. Although
finding more environmental outcomes may be challenging, having more environmental
outcomes especially those that are in the interests of the public may produce more meaningful
results. Research based on this wider range of environmental outcomes will help understand
the relationships between democratic countries and the environment. Many people may
incorrectly estimate the importance of democratic governments on environmental quality if
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only a few environmental outcomes are implemented. According to my analyses, as opposed
to local environmental quality, democracy in low- and high-income countries improves global
environmental outcomes.
Since different components of democracy provide useful information, research
assessing democratic countries should consider implementing these components. As opposed
to competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and
competitiveness of political participation, executive constraints in low- and high-income
countries improve global environmental outcomes. Since executive constraints provide more
consistent and significant results, future research may focus on the reasons why executive
constraints affect the environment, while the other components do not.
Finally, as opposed to the results without countries with different income levels, the
results with countries with different income groups suggest that democratic governments
sometimes influence (usually positively) environmental quality. Therefore, research assessing
democratic countries and the environment should consider estimating separate effects for
countries with different income levels. According to my analyses, democracy in low- and
high-income countries provides more significant results than that from middle-income
countries.
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to consider countries with different geographical
regions. This approach would help policy makers and researchers learn about an effect of
democratic governments on environmental quality in specific regions.
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Figure 1. Environmental outcomes across countries.
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Table 1. The three mechanisms and the four corresponding hypotheses.
Mechanism 1.
Democratic governments aim to
satisfy the majority while
autocratic governments aim to
satisfy the elites, and these
populations may have different
preferences.

Hypothesis 1a:
More democratic governments
improve environmental outcomes
directly affecting local health,
while have no effect on or worsen
environmental quality indirectly
affecting local health.

Hypothesis 1b:
Democratic governments lead to
better environmental quality in
high-income countries, while lead
to lower environmental quality in
low-income countries.
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Mechanism 2.
Democratic governments are less
likely to effectively enact policies
than autocratic governments.

Mechanism 3.
Democratic governments are
more likely to participate in
global environmental treaties than
autocratic governments.

Hypothesis 2:
Greater executive constraints lead
to worse environmental quality.
More democratic countries,
measured as other component
variables (e.g., competitiveness of
political recruitment), have no
effect on environmental quality.

Hypothesis 3:
Democratic governments lead to
better global environmental
quality, while have no effect on
local environmental quality.

Table 2. Bottom twelve countries for each variable
Ra
Terrestrial protected
Improved water sources
nk
areas (% of total land (% of population with
(lo
area)i
access)i
we CO2
st
emissions
to
(kt)i
hig
hes
t)
1
Lesotho
Djibouti
Papua New Guinea
2
3

4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Solomon
Islands
Central
African
Republic
Burundi
Chad
Cape
Verde
GuineaBissau

Revised
combined
Polity scorei

Institutional
ized
autocracyi

Institutionali Competitiveness of
zed
executive
democracyi
recruitmenti

Openness of
executive
recruitmenti

Executive Competitiveness of
constraint political
si
participationi

Qatar

Papua New
Guinea

Cuba

Equatorial Guinea

Congo

Saudi
Arabia

Papua New Guinea
Bhutan

Solomon Islands

Ethiopia

Saudi Arabia

Lebanon

Uzbekistan

Chad

Central African
Republic

Qatar

Uruguay

Madagascar

Swaziland

Slovenia

Eritrea

Sudan

Gabon

Uzbekista
Nigeria
n

Syria

Mauritania

Uzbekistan

Canada

Swaziland

Cambodia

Yemen

Lesotho

Mozambique

Oman

Guyana

Morocco

Rwanda

Uganda

Lebanon

Niger

Bahrain

Chile

Congo

Yemen

Yemen

Guinea-Bissau

Syria

El Salvador

Qatar

Burkina Faso

United Arab
Emirates
Laos

Gambia

Mauritania

Bhutan

El Salvador

Democratic Republic of
the Congo
Chad

Estonia
Luxembour
g

Equatorial
Uganda
Guinea
Saudi Arabia Gabon
Central African
Cote d'Ivoire
Republic

Djibouti

Fiji

Mali

Kuwait

Mali

Tunisia

Equatorial Guinea

China

Hungary

Kuwait

Congo

Eritrea

Morocco

Swaziland

Cuba

Argentina

Sudan

Guinea

Romania
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Sudan
Swazilan
d

Syria

Rwanda

Cuba

Qatar

Sudan

Congo

Cuba

Burkina Faso

Bahrain

Cambodia

Gabon

United Arab
Emirates
China

Chad

Yemen

Saudi Arabia

Equatorial
Guinea
Guinea

Equatoria
l Guinea
Chad

Laos

Uzbekistan
Kyrgyz Republic

Table 3. Top twelve countries for each variable
Ra
Terrestrial protected
Improved water sources
nk
areas (% of total land
(% of population with
(lo
area)i
access)i
we CO2
st
emission
to
s (kt)i
hig
hes
t)
134 South
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Africa
135 Italy
New Zealand
Israel
136 South
Tanzania
Norway
Korea
137 Saudi
Bhutan
Finland
Arabia
138 Canada
Guatemala
Germany
139 United
Kingdo
Botswana
Italy
m
140 German
Saudi Arabia
Japan
y
141
India
Trinidad and Tobago
Spain
142

Japan

143 Russia
144
China
145 United
States

Revised
combined
Polity scorei

Institutionali Institutionali
zed
zed
autocracyi
democracyi

Competitiveness of
executive
recruitmenti

Openness of
executive
recruitmenti

Executive Competitiveness of
constraint political
si
participationi

Japan

Laos

Uruguay

Uruguay

Azerbaijan

India

Netherlands

Cyprus

China

Slovenia

Laos

Belgium

United States

Sweden

Cuba

Austria

Argentina
Trinidad and
Tobago

Cyprus

Lesotho

United Kingdom

Denmark

Kuwait

Bulgaria

Belgium

Australia

Spain

Italy

Syria

United
Kingdom
Switzerland

Panama

Costa Rica

Uruguay

Japan

New Zealand

United Arab
Emirates

New
Zealand

Belgium

China

Denmark

Switzerland

Ireland

Bahrain

Portugal

India

Malawi

Paraguay

Slovenia

Switzerland

Oman

United
States

El Salvador

Finland

Czech
Republic

Hungary

Uzbekistan

Germany

Israel

Angola

Norway

France

Swaziland
Saudi
Arabia

Japan

Nicaragua

Bolivia

Canada

Italy

Slovenia

Eritrea

Qatar

Mauritius

Colombia

Mexico

Mauritius
United
States
Switzerla
nd

Nicaragua

Netherlands

Zambia

New Zealand

United
Kingdom
Netherlands

Germany

Australia

Finland

Venezuela

Denmark

Hungary
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Austria
Finland

Table 4. Descriptive statistics of response, key explanatory, and control variables.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Time periods
1992-2010
1992
2000
Response variables
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t
167,662
123,605
129,280
(612,992) (345,681) (249,455)
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land
11.93
11.49
12.49
areai,t
(9.322)
(9.456)
(9.063)
Improved water sources (% of population
83.81
79.96
82.75
with access)i,t
(18.10)
(19.94)
(20.15)
Key explanatory variables
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1
3.820
2.975
3.761
(6.522)
(7.227)
(6.681)
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1
1.854
2.364
1.924
(2.790)
(3.211)
(2.884)
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1
5.687
5.455
5.667
(3.968)
(4.247)
(4.066)
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1
2.096
2.078
2.076
(1.071)
(1.073)
(1.100)
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1
3.428
3.481
3.348
(1.309)
(1.242)
(1.353)
Executive constraintsi,t-1
5.003
4.831
5
(2.038)
(2.273)
(2)
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1
3.490
3.312
3.576
(1.321)
(1.507)
(1.266)
Control variables
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)i,t-1
9,847
8,799
9,824
(14,636)
(12,198)
(13,698)
Total Populationi,t-1
3.968×e7 4.858×e7 3.795×e7
(1.330×e8) (1.647×e8) (1.287×e8)
Urban population (% of total)i,t-1
55.08
51.93
56.33
(22.51)
(24.41)
(22.46)
Land area (sq. km)i,t-1
808,583
896,555
807,116
6
6
(1.963×e ) (1.897×e ) (1.767×e6)
Trade (% of GDP)i,t-1
79.61
66.96
76.43
(41.17)
(43.66)
(31.58)
Primary education enrollment ratei,t-1
0.362
0.354
0.358
(0.0892)
(0.0891)
(0.0892)
Number of observations
1899
79
67
Number of countries
145
79
67
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses.
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(4)
2010
237,416
(956,188)
16.43
(10.87)
87.35
(15.65)
4.748
(5.940)
1.427
(2.499)
6.182
(3.732)
2.200
(1.056)
3.473
(1.290)
5.273
(1.891)
3.627
(1.291)
11,417
(15,806)
5.159×e7
(1.736×e8)
57.29
(23.06)
824,667
(1.837×e6)
82.79
(34.90)
0.378
(0.0803)
111
111

Table 5. Correlations among response variables.
(1)
CO
emissions
Response variables
2
(kt)i,t
Time periods
Terrestrial protected areas (% of
0.0412*
total land area)i,t
Improved water sources (% of
0.148***
population with access)i,t
Number of observations
1899
Number of countries
145

(2)
Terrestrial protected areas (% of
total land area)i,t
1992-2010

0.0472**
1899
145

Notes: ***, **, * is calculated based on t-statistics and denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 6. Correlations among key explanatory variables and control variables.
(1)
(2)
(3)
Variables
Revised
Institutionalized
Institutionalized
combined
autocracyi,t-1
democracyi,t-1
Polity
scorei,t-1

(4)
Competitiveness of
executive
recruitmenti,t-1

(5)
Openness of
executive
recruitmenti,t-1

(6)
Executive
constraintsi,t-1

(7)
Competitiveness of
political
participationi,t-1

(8)
GDP per
capita
(constant
2005 US$)i,t-

(9)
Total
Populationi,t1

(10)
Urban
population
(% of
total)i,t-1

(11)
Land area
(sq. km)i,t-1

(12)
Trade (%
of GDP)i,t-1

1

Time periods
Institutionalized
autocracyi,t-1
Institutionalized
democracyi,t-1
Competitiveness of
executive
recruitmenti,t-1
Openness of
executive
recruitmenti,t-1
Executive
constraintsi,t-1
Competitiveness of
political
participationi,t-1
GDP per capita
(constant 2005
US$)i,t-1
Total Populationi,t-

1992-2010
-0.953***
0.977***

-0.865***

0.880***

-0.758***

0.917***

0.515***

-0.419***

0.553***

0.741***

0.956***

-0.867***

0.965***

0.878***

0.561***

0.856***

-0.771***

0.868***

0.711***

0.409***

0.797***

0.386***

-0.234***

0.471***

0.391***

0.170***

0.426***

0.475***

-0.00607

0.0170

0.00197

0.0313

0.0751***

0.0307

-0.0554**

-0.0341

0.395***

0.384***

0.602***

-0.0868***

0.0180

0.0475*

0.0533**

0.439***

0.113***

0.0416*

0.00331

0.130***

-0.234***

0.108***

-0.263***

0.235***

0.205***

0.195***

0.0155

0.192***

0.00544

0.0645***

1899

1899

1899

1899

1899

1899

1899

145

145

145

145

145

145

145

1

Urban population
0.344***
-0.206***
0.423***
0.418***
0.259***
(% of total)i,t-1
Land area (sq.
0.0347
-0.0374
0.0307
0.0379
0.0691***
km)i,t-1
Trade (% of
0.0164
0.0182
0.0399
0.0702***
0.0634***
GDP)i,t-1
Primary education
0.218***
-0.171***
0.235***
0.196***
0.0932***
enrollment ratei,t-1
Number of
1899
1899
1899
1899
1899
observations
Number of
145
145
145
145
145
countries
Notes: ***, **, * is calculated based on t-statistics and denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 7. Fixed effects (FE) estimation of environmental quality on the three composite indicators (revised combined Polity score, institutionalized autocracy, and institutionalized democracy)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t Improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t
Response variables
Time periods
1992-2010
1992-2010
1992-2010
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1
-3,318
-0.00646
0.0448
(2,771)
(0.0343)
(0.0678)
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1
6,638
-0.0860
0.105*
(5,651)
(0.160)
(0.0535)
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1
-5,074
0.0595
0.0713
(4,339)
(0.0690)
(0.104)
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)i,t-1
32.29*
32.12*
32.64*
-9.93e-07
-1.72e-05
8.25e-06
-0.000991***
-0.000989***
-0.000995***
(17.64)
(17.56)
(17.79)
(0.000173)
(0.000173)
(0.000174)
(0.000229)
(0.000227)
(0.000230)
2
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)i,t-1 -0.000396 -0.000394 -0.000399
1.26e-09
1.37e-09
1.22e-09
4.62e-09**
4.60e-09**
4.66e-09**
(0.000240) (0.000240) (0.000242)
(2.18e-09)
(2.16e-09)
(2.18e-09)
(2.08e-09)
(2.07e-09)
(2.09e-09)
Total Populationi,t-1
0.00960* 0.00959* 0.00960*
-6.03e-09
-5.73e-09
-6.47e-09
3.43e-08***
3.44e-08***
3.43e-08***
(0.00518) (0.00517) (0.00517)
(9.64e-09)
(9.85e-09)
(9.51e-09)
(1.15e-08)
(1.14e-08)
(1.15e-08)
Urban population (% of total)i,t-1
13,223
13,321
13,150
-0.0466
-0.0452
-0.0456
0.107
0.106
0.108
(8,856)
(8,878)
(8,846)
(0.0522)
(0.0526)
(0.0520)
(0.139)
(0.139)
(0.140)
Land area (sq. km)i,t-1
-7.836
-7.844
-7.838
3.40e-05
3.44e-05
3.35e-05
-3.92e-06
-3.80e-06
-3.90e-06
(6.169)
(6.175)
(6.176)
(3.31e-05)
(3.26e-05)
(3.36e-05)
(1.23e-05)
(1.22e-05)
(1.23e-05)
Trade (% of GDP)i,t-1
198.9
200.8
192.9
0.00739
0.00769
0.00720
-0.000180
-0.000194
-0.000107
(200.4)
(203.2)
(197.0)
(0.00493)
(0.00489)
(0.00494)
(0.00921)
(0.00916)
(0.00925)
Primary education enrollment ratei,t-1
-68,674
-64,222
-76,114
-2.490
-2.181
-2.637
19.72***
19.68***
19.82***
(97,580)
(99,086)
(96,317)
(2.688)
(2.664)
(2.674)
(5.317)
(5.281)
(5.344)
Number of observations
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
2
R
0.504
0.504
0.503
0.302
0.304
0.303
0.604
0.604
0.604
Number of countries
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
Country FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes: Coefficients on year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 8. Fixed effects (FE) estimation of environmental quality on the four component variables (competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive
recruitment, executive constraints, and competitiveness of political participation)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land Improved water sources (% of population with
Response variables
area)i,t
access)i,t
Time periods
1992-2010
1992-2010
1992-2010
Competitiveness of executive -11,475
0.0115
0.289
recruitmenti,t-1
(13,523)
(0.173)
(0.341)
Openness
of
executive
-8,032
0.0309
0.142
recruitmenti,t-1
(9,096)
(0.0871)
(0.247)
Executive constraintsi,t-1
-9,316
0.0521
4.62e-05
(7,750)
(0.125)
(0.243)
Competitiveness of political
-8,000
0.283
0.276*
participationi,t-1
(9,189)
(0.340)
(0.161)
Number of observations
1,899
1,899 1,899 1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
R2
0.503
0.503 0.504 0.503
0.302
0.302
0.302
0.304
0.604
0.604
0.603
0.604
Number of countries
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
Country FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes: Coefficients on control variables, year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. Coefficients on control variables are very similar to the ones
using the three composite indicators. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 9. Marginal effects of environmental quality on interactions among the three composite indicators and countries with four different income levels (low-, lower middle-, upper middle-, and high-income)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t Improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t
Response variables
Time periods
1992-2010
1992-2010
1992-2010
0.0710
-0.150
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1
-12,643*
(0.0974)
(0.103)
(6,995)
-0.0422
0.0790
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1 2,881
(3,840)
(0.0295)
(0.0859)
0.00982
0.00307
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1 -10,503
(6,538)
(0.0511)
(0.0775)
-0.0423
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1
-9,762*
0.146**
(0.0774)
(5,822)
(0.0711)
24,334
-0.0293
0.361
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1
(16,523)
(0.231)
(0.262)
-6,637
-0.171
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1
0.154***
(7,963)
(0.188)
(0.0529)
23,622
0.0630
0.0333
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(14,551)
(0.0804)
(0.188)
21,385
-0.206
0.133
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1
(13,276)
(0.148)
(0.209)
0.155
-0.221
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1
-19,793*
(0.164)
(0.172)
(10,401)
5,232
-0.0174
0.123
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(6,745)
(0.0572)
(0.144)
-14,515
0.0700
0.0299
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(9,672)
(0.0975)
(0.116)
-0.0457
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1
-13,661*
0.296**
(0.122)
(8,250)
(0.121)
Number of observations
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
R2
0.504
0.504
0.503
0.302
0.304
0.303
0.604
0.604
0.604
Number of countries
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
Country FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes: Coefficients on control variables, year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level,
respectively.
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Table 10. Marginal effects of environmental quality on interactions among the four component variables and countries with four different income levels (low-, lower middle-, upper middle-, and high-income)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t Improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t
Response variables
Time periods
1992-2010
1992-2010
1992-2010
-62,939
-0.0759
0.659
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Low-income country dummyi,t-1
(46,380)
(0.619)
(1.386)
6,909
-0.109
0.0416
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(17,699)
(0.169)
(0.433)
0.0272
0.545
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1 -40,192
(29,324)
(0.276)
(0.351)
-40,581
0.722
0.338
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1
(28,771)
(0.450)
(0.652)
0.401
-0.175
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1
-30,947*
(0.442)
(0.614)
(18,209)
-12,871
0.0467
-0.0603
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(11,684)
(0.116)
(0.288)
-623.6
-0.130
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1
0.398**
(4,890)
(0.154)
(0.166)
-1,226
0.286
0.691
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1
(5,325)
(0.210)
(0.606)
0.426
Executive constraintsi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1
-32,145**
-0.872***
(0.268)
(15,404)
(0.320)
2,548
-0.0908
0.153
Executive constraintsi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(10,492)
(0.0989)
(0.305)
-20,410
0.110
-0.118
Executive constraintsi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(13,600)
(0.182)
(0.278)
-0.349
Executive constraintsi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1
-21,577*
0.571**
(0.273)
(12,654)
(0.228)
-20,605
-0.142
-0.241
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1
(18,684)
(0.453)
(0.360)
14,885
0.215
0.531
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(14,632)
(0.143)
(0.408)
-36,187
0.294
-0.00333
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1
(30,845)
(0.244)
(0.448)
-26,428
0.115
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1
0.701**
(20,529)
(0.351)
(0.316)
Number of observations
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
1,899
R2
0.503
0.503
0.504
0.503
0.302
0.302
0.302
0.304
0.604
0.604
0.603
0.604
Number of countries
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
145
Country FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
Notes: Coefficients on control variables, year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively.
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